The paper aims at identifying impact of corporate governance variables i.e. board structure (board size, board independence, board activity and board busyness) and ownership structure (foreign promoters holding, institutional shareholding and CEO duality) on financial disclosures made by the Indian firms. Using cross sectional data of 325 listed firms for the financial year 2009-10, we compute financial disclosure score (using 171 checklist points) based on disclosure requirements of accounting standards. We find average disclosure score of 73%, maximum and minimum being 100% and 46% respectively. Our finding support agency theory in terms of monitoring role of board since board size is found to be significant however we do not find any influence of board independence on the disclosures. The study also supports resource dependency theory in terms of outside directorship which might provide exposure to different corporate environment, brings diverse perspectives and knowledge to the directors and this in turn leads to improved disclosures. We also support the notion that having foreign promoter shareholding improves disclosures.
Introduction
Issue of corporate disclosures has been widely discussed in recent years mainly due to financial crises and need of effective corporate governance system. Why corporates should disclose more information in financial reports has been pronounced in several theories like stakeholder theory, agency theory, legitimacy theory and political economy theory (Choi, 1973) . The agency theory implies that companies increase disclosure in order to reduce conflicts between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). In addition, companies aiming to increase their firm value may do so by increased disclosure (Lobo, 2001 ). Several studies have mentioned that improved disclosure reduces the gap between management and the outsiders, enhances the value of stock in the capital market, increases liquidity and reduces cost of capital (Apostolos, 2009; Karim, 1996; McKinnon, 2009 ).
Accounting and stock market frauds have increased importance of transparency and reliability of the financial information provided to markets (Lang M. & Lundholm R., 2000) . In response to financial scandals (like Enron, WorldCom, Satyam) and accounting irregularities as seen in several scams, the regulatory authorities from several countries has taken initiative to improve information disclosures environment, mitigate conflicts of interest and ensure the independence of auditors to protect the investors interests' and increase the confidence of capital markets (Leuz, 2003) . Weak corporate governance system may provide an opportunity for managers to act against the interest of shareholders. Effective corporate governance system assists in improving financial performance and corporate valuation (Klapper, 2004; Rajagopalan, 2008) . As a part of corporate ethics, stakeholder calls for transparent and reliable financial disclosures.
Board of directors and ownership structure plays crucial role in monitoring managerial activities and also reduces agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling,1976) . Several studies have shown evidence of a significant relation between the characteristics of the board of directors and the integrity of accounting information (Hashim, 2008; Patelli, 2007; Rahman, 2006) . In corporate governance, the monitoring role of boards of directors is a critical component of internal control (Jensen, 1986) . Weak governance has been found to be the prime reason of discounting emerging economies in the financial markets (La Porta, 2000) .
Considering importance of corporate governance mechanism in driving firms to disclose adequate and sufficient information to the shareholders, our study aims at examining impact of effective corporate governance mechanism i.e. Board structure and ownership Structure on financial disclosures. We focus on India as it is one of the largest emerging economies and we hope that results will also be applicable to other emerging economies as well.
The paper is motivated considering the fact that disclosures are important tool for communicating financial and non-financial information to the shareholders. It is the responsibility of the board to monitor the activities of managers. In India, Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has recommended implementation of effective governance system for investors' protection to drive economic growth and development through investment in financial markets. When it comes to disclosures especially financial disclosures, several Accounting Standards (AS)/Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are prescribed by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) to be followed while preparing financial statements. Hence, an investigation of impact of effective corporate governance mechanism on financial disclosures would benefit not only the investors and other stakeholders but also to regulatory authorities for whom the study may act as feedback for existing regulatory environment.
We aim to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, several studies have focused on effective corporate governance mechanism through board monitoring and independence and its association with financial performance (Baysinger, 1985; Bhagat, 2008 However there is limited focus on impact of corporate governance on disclosure policy of the firms. Our study focuses on impact of corporate governance mechanism i.e. board structure and ownership structure on financial disclosures considering disclosure requirements of Accounting Standards/GAAP in India. We prepare checklist/questionnaire of 171 points (considering accounting standards disclosure) as a part of our disclosure index which enables us to examine the extent of financial disclosures. Second, most of the studies related to disclosures and corporate governance have focused on developed countries there is limited work done in emerging market context (especially linking corporate governance with disclosures). Our study may help to understand impact of corporate governance on disclosure environment in emerging market context since Indian corporate environment is one of the largest amongst emerging economies. Finally, earlier studies that focused on impact of disclosures on governance considered either voluntary disclosures or specific financial statements disclosers (Chen, 1998; Forker, 1992 ; L.L. Eng, 2003; Simon S.M Ho, 2001; Nazli A. Mohd Ghazali, 2008), whereas we focus on all the disclosures that are laid down by Indian Accounting Standards to determine the level of disclosure for each firm.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides overview of financial reporting and corporate governance environment in India. Section 3 discusses related literature on board structure, ownership structure and financial disclosures and lay down hypothesis of the study. Section 4 mentions data selection process and methodology for data analysis. Section 5 narrates results and discusses output. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance in India
In India, financial reporting and disclosure requirements are mainly governed by Companies Act and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) whereas corporate governance requirements come from Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). In this section we shall discuss regulatory requirements about financial reporting and corporate governance in Indian context.
Financial reporting and disclosures
Financial reporting is the communication of financial information of an enterprise to the stakeholders. Within a corporate context, financial reporting includes set of accounting statements which includes Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement. These statements are also required to fulfil statutory requirements of various regulatory authorities. Other financial statements prepared by companies based on the requirements are Consolidated Financial Statements, Segment Reporting, Environmental reporting etc.
The Companies Act, 1956 lays down the detailed provisions regarding the maintenance of books of accounts and the preparation and presentation of annual accounts. The Act also prescribes the mechanism for issuance of accounting standards.
ICAI is a statutory body having the mandate to regulate and develop the financial accounting and auditing professions. For preparation and presentation of information in the financial statement ICAI issues Accounting Standards which are reviewed and notified by National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACASA). Chartered Accountant, acting as Statutory Auditor certifies the financial statements of the companies. An unqualified/clean audit report assures the users that information contained in the annual accounts is reliable.
Corporate Governance Mechanism
The focus on issues of Corporate Governance has gained momentum in Indian Corporate Sector in the past decade. In 1991, the Indian Government enacted a series of reforms aimed at general economic liberalization. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), India's securities market regulator was formed in 1992. It issues guidelines and monitor corporate in the issuance of capital and transfer of securities, in addition to all intermediaries and persons associated with securities market. Listed corporations are required to comply with various provisions of SEBI and submit financial statements and reports from time to time. In addition to this SEBI plays important role of acting as a supervisory body to implement corporate governance requirements. In the year 2000, it has issued Clause 49 which sets out the detailed requirements of compliance to corporate governance principles.
The 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on financial disclosures is driven by several theoretical foundations. Agency theory is one of the foremost theories dealing with disclosure and governance and it mentions about conflict of interest between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) due to separation of ownership and management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioned that since managers do not own resources they may create "Moral Hazard" because they would try to hide their inefficiency to avoid loss of rewards linked to their performance. To monitor agents, principals would call for effective corporate governance mechanism and adequate disclosure of information. Resource dependence view of corporate governance suggests that board of directors provides essential resources through their expertise and linkages to other firms and institutions (Hillman A. J., 2003; Pfeffer, 1972) . This may encourage board to disclose relevant information to the shareholders. Signalling theory indicates that information asymmetry between a company and the investors causes adverse selection. To avoid this situation, companies disclose information voluntarily, providing signals to the market (Watts, 1986) . Political process theory suggests that regulators make decisions based on the information disclosed by firms (Watts, 1986 ). This may also lead to study the impact of corporate governance mechanism (enforced by regulators) on disclosure policy of firms. Higher information disclosure is expected to justify a firm's large profits and thus avoid legal obligations (Giner, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1993) . Political costs and the competitive environment also influence the level of information disclosed in an industry (Mora and Rees, 1998) .
Considering theoretical foundations and related literature we construct hypothesis which are explained along with the literature discussion for each variables considered in the study.
Financial Disclosure
Agency costs are frequently cited as an explanation of why companies may disclose financial information (Chow, 1987 ; Hossain M. and Adams M., 1995). Such disclosures assist principals to monitor the activities of their agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
Owusu Ansah (1998) defines adequate disclosure as the extent (no. of items) to which mandated applicable information is presented in annual reports of companies and the degree of intensity by which a company discloses those items in its annual report. Cerf (1961) studied the corporatespecific attributes which determines the extent of disclosure and observed that significant differences in disclosure appeared to be a function of a variety of corporate-specific attributes including asset size, number of shareholders, and profitability. Buzby (1974) measured the disclosure of 39 selected informational items in the annual reports of 88 small and medium sized companies and concluded that the companies should give due consideration to information needs of the users of financial statements while deciding on the items to be included in the annual reports. Seshan (1980) carried out a survey of the financial reporting practices followed by 200 public limited companies in India and concluded that many companies were not disclosing the accounting policies and the supplementary financial statements in their annual reports and laid emphasis on the inclusion of these statements in the annual reports.
Singhvi and Desai (1971) studied the association between disclosure of certain informational items and the company characteristics, such as asset size, number of stockholders, listing status, CPA firms, rate or return and earnings margin taking a sample of 100 listed and 55 unlisted US companies for the year 1965-66. They concluded from their study that extent of disclosure was lower for unlisted companies and the disclosure was positively associated with total assets, number of shareholders, CPA firm, and earnings margin. Several studies have argued that while disclosure may be mandated by regulatory bodies, sizeable scope remains in determining what information is actually provided (Wallace, 1980; Lang and Lundholm, 1993) . Nangia (2005) examined the disclosure practice of 10 Indian companies and 10 Multinational Corporations operating in India from 1992 to 2001. She studied the association between the extent of disclosure (index of 106 items) and certain company characteristics like size, profitability and type of industry. She found that while there is no association between the extent of disclosure and size and profitability of companies in both groups, type of industry has a significant association with the extent of disclosure.
In this paper Financial Disclosures are used as dependent variable considering the Disclosure score computed through disclosure questionnaire/checklist (171 points) prepared from disclosures required by each accounting standards.
Board Structure
Effective corporate governance mechanism is always designed to felicitate monitoring role of directors (Jensen,1986) . Several studies have focused on size of the board, presence of independent directors in the board, frequency of board meetings as effective criteria to monitor board activities. Well-functioning board may also lead to better quality disclosure.
We consider following variables as proxy variables for board structure.
Board Size
Size of the board plays important role in monitoring the activities of managers. Large size of the board may provide better supervision and high quality corporate decisions (Pearce, 1992) . Small sized board may affect the level and extent of monitoring (Davila, 2009; Ferraz, 2011) . Large board may also bring in more expertise and knowledge which may be useful to financial reporting practices.
In India, as per The Companies Act a minimum of three and maximum of 15 directors are prescribed on the board. It permits more than 15 directors after passing a special resolution.
Considering the importance of board on improving quality of financial reporting and disclosures we propose following hypothesis.
H1: The size of the Board of Directors is positively associated with financial disclosures.
Board Independence
Several studies in corporate governance literature have discussed about role of independent directors in improving financial reporting and disclosure quality. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Leftwich (1981) mentioned that independent directors in the board will be more effective to control mangers and improve disclosures. Independent directors are always considered as a tool for monitoring management behaviour (Rosenstein, 1990 ) and they may improve disclosure of information. Forker (1992) reported that a higher percentage of outside directors on boards enhanced the monitoring of the financial disclosure quality and reduced the benefits of withholding information.
In India, the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement mandates that for listed companies, where the chairman is an executive director (ED) or a promoter, the board should have at least 50% independent directors (IDs) and Where the Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director, at least one-third of the Board should comprise of independent directors.
Considering the monitoring and control function of independent directors we present following hypothesis.
H2: The proportion of Independent directors on the board is positively associated with financial disclosures.
Board Activeness
Board monitoring role also depends upon its activeness. Number of meeting during financial year is one of the important determinants of its activeness. Monitoring function of board gets affected if they do not meet or meet only few times (Menon, 1994) . Previous studies from Adams (2003) and Garcia Lara et. al. (2009) among others supported that no. of meetings can be considered as proxy for board monitoring. Active board is also expected to work towards safeguarding interest of shareholders and making the financial reporting process more transparent.
In India, the Companies Act and SEBI Listing Agreement prescribe a minimum of four board meetings a year. Considering the positive impact of board activeness on disclosure we present following hypothesis.
H3: Board activeness (No. of board meetings) is positively associated with financial disclosures.
Board Busyness
Directors are allowed to act on board of several companies. Multiple directorships may signal talent superiority and expertise in bringing different exposure to the board. They may generate benefits as they have many networks and access to the resources (Pfeffer, 1972) . This is also supported by reputation hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ; Jensen M.,1986). There is also alternate view that multiple directorships may compromise on commitment and quality of monitoring and in turn adversely affect the whole purpose of corporate governance. This view is supported by Lipton et. al. (1992) who argued about compromise on commitment and Beasley (1996) who documented about relation between multiple directorship and financial statement fraud.
In India, The Companies Act limits the maximum number of outside directorship for all directors to 10 public companies, and 20 in all.
Considering that outside directorship brings expertise and resource dependence theory view we expect positive impact on financial disclosure and set following hypothesis.
H4: Board busyness (No. of outside directorship) is positively associated with financial disclosures.
Ownership Structure and Leadership
Various aspects of ownership structure like Government ownership, foreign ownership, Institutional ownership have been considered in previous studies. Separation of ownership and control has been responsible for agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . It has also been observed that potential of agency problem is sever when shares are widely held as compared to when they are in the hands of few (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The type of board leadership and role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) can also influence disclosure policy of companies. Considering role of ownership distribution and CEO leadership we propose following hypothesis.
Proportion of Institutional Shareholdings
Due to higher ownership stake, institutional shareholders may influence the decision making of board. They may even encourage higher disclosures in the financial statements. Carson (1997) Considering the role of Institutional investors to monitor board activities and in turn influence disclosures, we propose following hypothesis.
H5: Higher proportion of institutional ownership is positively associated with financial disclosures.
Proportion of Foreign Promoter Shareholdings
Companies with foreign promoter holding may also have to comply with financial reporting requirements from several regulators which may improve their disclosure practices. Foreign shareholding can play an important role in improving disclosures. Haniffa (2002) found a significant positive relationship between the proportion of foreign ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure by listed companies in Malaysia. Singhvi (1968) found that Indian companies with higher foreign ownership of stock presented higher quality disclosure than locally owned companies. Barako et. al. (2006) also reported significant relation between institutional shareholdings and corporate voluntary disclosures for Kenyan listed companies.
Considering the important role of foreign promoters in improving disclosures we test following hypothesis.
H6: The proportion of foreign promoter holding is positively associated with financial disclosures.
CEO Duality
Chairman of board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a company play major role in the decision making of the firm. It has always been a question whether dual leadership role (chairman and CEO) in the hand of one person is beneficial for effective corporate governance mechanism. According to agency theory, the combined functions may weaken the boards' most important function of monitoring, disciplining and compensating senior managers. It also leads to managerial opportunism due to control of CEO over board decisions. Forker (1992) empirically studied the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality, and presented evidence and reported a negative relationship between disclosure quality and "dominant personality" (measured as board chair and CEO combined). Even Fama and Jensen (1983) reported that CEO duality "signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control".
Considering the possible compromise on governance by the firm with dual role in the hand of one person, we propose following hypothesis.
H7: CEO Duality is negatively associated with financial disclosures.
Firm Attributes as control variables
It has been reported in several studies that disclosure practices of a firm is driven by several firm characterists. Considering the previous literature findings about impact on firm characterists on disclosure practice we consider firm size, profitability, leverage, age and audit quality as control variables.
Size of a firm is assumed to positively affect the level of disclosure in the financial statements. Since cost of generating and disseminating information is higher, larger firms may be able to easily bear the cost. They have necessary resources and expertise to generate information. In the prior research, size has been found to be a significant factor in explaining the differences in the extent of disclosure (like Cooke T E, 1992, Joshi and Mudhahki, 2001 and Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Chow (1987) argued that agency costs increases with firm size and hence adequate disclosures help to mitigate the cost of agency conflicts. We consider natural logarithm of total assets and market capitalization as proxy for size of a firm.
Corporate profitability normally affects the financial disclosure positively as suggested by prior research regarding the association between the profitability and level of disclosure (Belkaoui A and Kahl, 1978; Singhvi and Desai, 1971 and Wallace R S O et. al., 1994). Profitable firms will be able to bear the cost of disclosure and would also like to continue its image amongst stakeholders. We consider return on assets (ROA) as measure of profitability.
Disclosure of information is also beneficial for the firm that uses debt as a source of finance to maintain trust and confidence amongst creditors. Lenders are likely to force the firms to disclose more. Several studies have found the relationship between leverage and the extent of disclosure is expected to be positive (Bradbury, 1992 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . However others did not find any association between leverage and disclosure (Carson, 1997; Hossain M. and Adams M., 1995). We use debt to total capital employed (Debt + Equity) ratio in the present study as measure of leverage.
Older companies are generally expected to disclose more information since they are established in the market. Younger firms may suffer from competitive disadvantage while disclosing information. Older firms also have expert and trained manpower. Disclosure may even improve with passage of time. Owusu Ansah (1998) mentioned that older firms are in a better position to bear the cost of disclosures. We consider natural logarithm of age.
Craswell 
Data and Methodology

Data and Sample
Companies Though companies may disclosure information in variety of ways, the annual report is considered as most effective and reliable source of information. Annual report is an authentic document as it is audited and submitted to various regulatory authorities. We have collected information related to financial disclosures and corporate governance variables from annual report. The data for the study has been collected from Annual report of individual company for the year ended 31 st March 2010. In order to extract the information items, financial and non-financial items of the annual reports were considered. This included reports of directors, report of auditors, corporate governance report, statement of accounting policies, profit and loss account, balance sheet, statement of cash flows, notes to the accounts.
Data about firm characteristics like size, profitability, leverage is collected from PROWESS database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The dataset provides comprehensive firm level information about the financial statements such as balance sheet (total assets, current assets, total debt and liabilities), income statement (sales, expenditures and taxes), and cash flow statement. st March 2010, all the 29 mandatory AS are considered for the purpose of present study. These Accounting Standards are required to be followed by every listed company and therefore its applicability is not dependent on nature of industry. Some of them are not applicable to financial companies however it does not affect the study as our sample includes only non-financial companies. On the basis of disclosures requirements of accounting standards a questionnaire consisting of 171 items of disclosures has been prepared. The disclosures requirements have been broken down carefully into 171 items to ensure that they can be answered objectively. Following Table 2 provides no. of points considered from each Accounting Standard. Disclosure index has been computed by unweighted approach because each item of disclosure is equally important. It also reduces subjectivity and it provides a neutral assessment of items. On the questionnaire, each item is given weightage of 1 and coded as 1 if disclosed; and 0 if not disclosed and NA if not applicable. Complete annual report for each company is read in order to understand the nature and complexity of each company's operation and to form an opinion about the company before scoring the items.
Following is the formula for computation of Disclosure Score from Disclosure Questionnaire.
DS: Disclosure Score was computed by dividing total no. of disclosures made by a company with total no. of disclosures applicable for that company. 
Model Construction
In order to determine the effect of Board Structure, Ownership and Leadership Structure and firm attributes on financial disclosures following models are used.
Model 1
The relationship between financial disclosure score and board structure variables are tested (using firm attributes as control variables) using following model.
Model 2
The relationship between financial disclosure score and ownership and leadership variables are tested (using firm attributes as control variables) using following model.
Model 3
The relationship between financial disclosure score, board structure, ownership variables and firm attributes are tested using following model. 
Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the study are provided in following Table 4 : It can be observed that average Disclosure Score (DS) of overall sample is 73%. Highest disclosure is 100% and lowest is 46%. Maximum board size of 24 and minimum 3 is reported. This shows that all the companies in sample complied with minimum board size of 3 members as required by Indian Companies Act. Minimum board activity i.e. no. of board meetings has been found to be 4 which is in line with the regulatory requirement. When it comes to board busyness i.e. outside directorship, it has been observed that maximum average directorship is 15 which are also within the limit set by regulators. We did not notice any non-compliance with Corporate Governance norms.
Financial Disclosure score and variable descriptions
To check the level of compliance, disclosure questionnaire is constructed using disclosures required by each accounting standards. Disclosure Score has been assigned to each company. Following Table 5 provides range of disclosure achieved by companies. About 10% of the sample companies had very law score between 41 to 50%.
We also provide variable description for different range of disclosure score in Table 6 . We can observe that companies with higher board size (mean of 10.3) and outside directorship (mean of 38.87) have achieved higher disclosure score (between 91 to 100%). The average proportion of independent directors remains almost same at different level of disclosure score. This may be because most of the companies have just complied with the regulatory requirement (Mean is 57% to 61% across different ranges of disclosure scores). Higher average of foreign promoter holding (mean between 8 to 10%) is observed for companies with higher disclosure range (71 to 100%). Average institutional ownership is higher (12.94 and 10.81%) for the firm with higher disclosures score range (91 to 100 and 71 to 80%).
Correlation Analysis
We present Pearson correlations in Table 7 to identify possible correlations between variables considered in the study. The results suggest that disclosure score is correlated with board size, board busyness, foreign holding and institutional holding. Amongst firm attributes; size, profitability and audit quality are found to be significantly correlated with disclosure score.
Higher correlations (.59) have been found between board busyness and size of the firm and also between institutional holding and size of the firm (.53). Other significant correlations are highlighted in the table. Considering several significant correlations amongst variables, we have also tested the data for multicollinearity by calculating VIF values. The results are presented in Table 8 along with regression results and shows that Maximum VIF is 2.33 amongst all the models used in the study. Since the VIF is less than 10, multicollinearity problem is not cause of concern (Myers, 1990 ).
Regression Results
We present regression results in for models tested using OLS in Table 8 .
Model 1 considers board structure variables as independent variables along with firm characteristics as control variables. We find positive association between board busyness and disclosures as well as between board size and disclosure. Our results support resource dependency theory which suggests that board of directors provide essential resources in the form of knowledge and expertise and agency theory which suggests the monitoring role of directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson et. al., 2007) . Several studies have also indicated that larger boards reduce dominance of CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Goodstein et. al., 1994 ) which may encourage more disclosures for stakeholders. However, we do not find any association between board independence and disclosure as well as between board activeness and disclosure.
Model 2 considers ownership structure variables as independent variables along with firm characteristics as control variables. We find positive association between foreign shareholding and disclosures. This may be because firm with foreign holdings are mainly multinationals and accountable to various regulatory requirements. Haniffa (2002) and Singhvi (1968) also found proportion of foreign ownership as significantly related level of disclosure. We do not find any association between institutional investors' shareholding and disclosures. Our result do not see any impact of CEO duality (CEO also being MD) on disclosures and it does not support that CEO duality will negatively affect disclosures. In model 3 we consider all the board structure variables, ownership Structure variables and firm characteristics as independent variables. Our results are consistent with model 2 and 3 as we find board size, board busyness and foreign shareholding as significant variables positively affecting disclosures. Amongst firm characterists as control variables (in model 2, 3 and 4), audit quality is significant for all models, however size is significant only in model 2. Profitability is also significant consistently (at 10% level in Model 1 and 3 and at 5% level in Model 2). We do not find any association between age and disclosures.
Conclusions
Considering the importance of disclosures and effective corporate governance in increasing investors' confidence and bring accountability to the stakeholders, the study aims at identifying possible impact of board structure, ownership structure and firm attributes on financial disclosure. We find that average disclosure score for listed Indian companies are low (73%) the minimum being just 46%. These scores indicate that there are many companies who do not comply with disclosure requirements of accounting standards. This is alarming, considering the fact that we have only considered listed companies which are audited and supervised by the Stock exchange and Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). However, we did not notice any noncompliance with Corporate Governance norms.
We provide mixed evidence for agency theory and resource dependence theory when we test impact of board structure variables on financial disclosure controlling for firm attributes. We find board size and board busyness (outside directorship) to be positively related to financial disclosure. Larger board plays effective monitoring role (agency theory) and also brings knowledge and expertise which improves disclosures (resource dependency theory). Their exposure to different business environments through outside directorship (resource dependency theory) is also found to be positively affecting disclosures. We do not find any influence of board independence (agency theory) and board activity on disclosures.
Considering ownership concentration variables we find foreign promoter holding to be associated with disclosures. This may be because foreign promoters have to comply with various regulatory requirements from different countries. We do not find any influence of higher institutional ownership on financial disclosure. Our findings do not support the view that CEO duality may compromise the disclosure (agency theory). We do not find any impact CEO duality (CEO and MD being same) on disclosures.
Findings of the paper are subject to a few limitations. We had to exclude several companies due to non-availability of annual report. The compliance level of such companies may be low but we are unable to capture the same. We rely on financial statements and other information as published in the annual report. We are unable to know the correctness of such information. We have considered accounting standards disclosures which are mainly financial disclosures. This study can be further extended by considering non-financial disclosures made by the companies.
Despites limitations, our study provides useful insights for policy makers and regulators. It can act as feedback to standard setting bodies and regulators. The low disclosure scores signal the need for better monitoring by SEBI and ICAI. We also see influence of corporate governance variables on disclosures and this may help policy makers to frame appropriate policies so that effective corporate governance also leads to improved disclosures. 
